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Introduction
  There exists currency turmoil throughout all East Asian countries. It started from speculating 
Thai Baht in July 1997 and now is having an influence on Korean, Hong Kong and Japanese 
currencies. The story of this turmoil tells us the real nature of the recent changing East Asian 
world. Does this reflect a sign of the end of an age when East Asian economic planners look for 
a huge amount of foreign capital to develop economies ? We can anticipate that there will occur 
intense competition to devalue the exchanges rates of the East Asian currencies. " 
  China is the most important factor causing the drastic change in East Asia. China opened its 
door to the outside world only 19 years ago. Since that time, it has become an diamatic 
entrepreneurial powerhouse. The ensuing years of super-growth have left China with one of the 
world's biggest holders of foreign reserves and trade surplus, however, these facts produce the fear 
that China is becoming the second Japan. 2)
  1 Shortage of Money for Financing World Growth 
  World-wide funds running around the globe is growing. About $1.5 trillion is now held in 
international equity portfolios. Even pension funds in the industrial countries which were 
traditionally cautious investors are looking for overseas opportunities to meet their steep funding 
obligations. Also, the need among developing nations for infrastructure is immense for the next 
decade at $1 trillion. 
  Nevertheless, money flowing into the productive basis could be shortage because of its high 
volatility. About three years ago, Business Week had already pointed out the possibility of capital 
shortage in financing world growth. Fast developing regions, such as Latin America and East 
Asia, have been absorbing more than $140 billion annually that is triple the amount of capital they 
absorbed in the late 1980s. Also since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the formerly communist 
nations of Eastern and Central Europe have been labouring to produce an attractive investment 
environment. These region could easily absorb up to $500 billion (Business Week, October. 3, 
1994, p. 42). 
  Though the world faces an accelerating demand for capital that is unprecedented, nowadays, 
capital tends to fly away easilier and swiftlier from the country which was the central planning 
one. In additon, Japanese investors have virtually disappeared from the global stage. After playing 
a leading role as world financers during the 1980s, today's Japan inwardly focuses on repairing its 
damaged financial system. Ever since 1991, the outflows of long-term capital from Japan have
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shrunk to just one-tenth of their 1980s peak of $137 billion. As a result, the intense competition 
for capital will result in higher interest rates and increased currency volatility as investment 
demand outstrips the global supply of excess savings (Business Week, ibid., p. 43). 
   On the one hand, a large amount of the foreign capital is flowing into China, but on the other 
hand, huge quantity of the capital also has been flowing out of Southeast Asian countries. 
According to the report of the NRI (Nomura Research Institute), the volume of the capital drain 
from the four countries in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippine, Malaysia, and Indonesia is 
estimated $22 billion in 1997 ( Nippon Keizai Shinbun, 1997.8.30). IIF, the subsidiary of the 
World Bank, reported that the net private foreign capital inflow into the East Asia would diminish 
in 1997 by 25 % (Nippon Keizai Shinbun, 1997.9.11). 
  2 Lessons from the Turmoil over the Thai Baht 
  Thai Prime Minister Chavalit is to be blamed for delaying the timing of the devaluation of the 
Baht consciousnessly in order to save his favourite big companies. Many companies have been 
borrowing foreign money without any hedging and Chavalit has poured huge amount of official 
money to them prior to the day of the Baht's devaluation. Thai Central Bank has continued to lend 
money without any qualification to financial institutions with the outcome being a disaster. The 
total amount of such money poured into 58 nonbanks now put under suspension has reached Bt43 
billion which was said to be poured into estate agents which suffered from being short of money 
(Nippon Kerizai Shinbun, 1997.8.24). Even some high government officials were said to have 
speculated using the Baht. The currency turmoil in Thailand is not only due to unskilled money 
managing techniques but also due to malignant political habitude of this country (Nippon Kerizai 
Shinbun, 1997.9.11). 
  Thailand has been praised for its openness to foreign investment. The accessibility of its 
domestic market has been widely held up as an example to other developing countries. However, 
as one of the biggest mistakes, the Thai government has raised domestic interest rates high to 
defend the Baht's pegged exchange rate at a time when exports were decreasing and the current 
account deficit began widening. This encouraged Thai financial institutions and large corporations 
to borrow foreign currency at low interest rates in order to fund their domestic investments. Thai 
banks and finance companies raised funds in overseas markets from 2 to 3% interest a year and 
then lent money to Thai firms at domestic interest rates of more than 15% a year. 
  At present, 21 Japanese banks are operating in Thailand, and their credit balances were $37 
billion in July 1997, 30 to 40% of Thailand's total debt which was estimated to be about $90 
billion. Many Japanese banks which have no branch office in Thailand have been financing via 
non-banks in Thailand. However, they did not advance for long-term financing. The amount of 
Thai's short-term debt from Japanese banks which was to be repaid within a year was $15 billion 
or so. 3) 
  Despite large foreign capital inflows, to make matters worse, much of these investments went 
into Bangkok's overheated property market. When a serious mismatch between supply and 
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demand in the capital's property market occurred in 1996, prices of offices and condominiums 
dropped drastically. Also, it triggered a financial crisis that exerted strong pressure on the Baht. 
On July 2, this pressure forced the Thai government to abandon its pegged exchange rate system. 
However, the government has continued to maintain high domestic interest rates to prevent he 
currency from being devalued. 
  The sharp depreciation of the Thai Baht has made many Thai banks and finance companies 
scramble for new capital to cover their increased loan risks. The Baht depreciation has also forced 
many of bank's corporate customers to default on their foreign currency loans. In addition, the 
loan defaults could greatly push up the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) assets of banks 
and finance companies. Thai commercial banks' non-performing loans are said to have risen to 
Bt560 billion ($19.31 billion), equivalent to 14% of all outstanding loans. 
   Thai finance companies are worse. than the banks because of their more aggressive lending 
policies. The finance companies' bad or doubtful oans will rise to Bt440 billion, or 30% of their 
total loan portfolios. That would bring the combined non-performing loans to 20%, or Btl.1 
trillion, of Thailand's (1996) gross domestic product (GDP) .4' 
  According to the July 15, 1997 Goldman Sachs (Asia) report, in the worst case scenario, the 
devaluation of the Baht threatens to push NPLs to 35% of GDP, on the other hand, in the best 
case scenario would see NPLs reach 26% of GDP. By comparison, during the worst of the 
Mexican currency crisis in 1994, the Mexican NPLs were at 18% of GDP. So the Thai situation is 
much worse than Mexico's in terms of overall debt held by businesses. The ratio of total loans to 
GDP for Thailand was 140% at the end of 1996. Mexico's ratio stood at 45% during its crisis 
(Asian Business, August, p. 24) . 5) 
  Thailand's bankruptcy laws have serious shortcomings. Under the current law, creditors hould 
wait up to 20 years to seize assets. If a company goes bankrupt, its assets are frozen for 20 years 
(Asian Business, ibid., p. 23). 
  There is hardly any positive effects coming from the devaluation of the Baht. The import 
content of Thai exports is about 40% of the total value, so manufacturing firms are vulnerable to 
higher costs of imported raw materials, parts and production machineries. Labour-intensive 
manufacturers will be especially vulnerable to the effect of the wage-cost pressures that are likely 
to develop following a depreciation. Typically, when there's a depreciation, cost-push pressures 
tend to arise. These pressures always occur regardless of whether there is a significant import 
content in the product or not. They are going to put severe pressure on wage demands. Meanwhile 
the Baht depreciation is hurting the labour-intensive industrial sectors in unexpected ways. The 
Thai shrimp farming industry, for example, has been hit by Japanese buyers' demands for a 10% 
price cut (Asian Business, ibid., p. 23) .6) 
  The total foreign currency borrowings by the Thai corporate sector amount to about $67.5 
billion. However, most Thai corporations have not hedged their foreign currency borrowings 
against foreign exchange risks largely because they did not expect he currency peg to drop in this 
way. Moreover, the lack of a long-term debt market in Baht makes hedging against foreign 
exchange risks prohibitively expensive. To use short-term hedges for long-term loans costs about
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10% of the loan amount a year, so it was reasonable that they did hot hedge. 
  For now, persistent high bank interest rates in Thailand have continued to impede economic 
growth. The Bank of Thailand raised bank interest rates by two percentage points in & defensive 
move before floating the currency. Over the next six to 12 months, interest rates are likely to 
climb. This is because the shift from a stable exchange rate system to a more volatile floating 
exchange rate environment increases the amount of risk. Investors need to seek more increased 
reward in the form of higher interest rates. Also, a drop in currency value will produce higher 
inflation, which makes it harder to reduce interest rates. Higher interest rates also causes corporate 
profits to shrink at a time when many companies are already suffering from painful foreign 
exchange debt repayments hat have swollen due to the devaluation. 
   The move to freer exchange rate policies tend to lead to the so-called 'competitive 
devaluations'. The Baht devaluation led to sizable losses among Thai corporations with high 
foreign exchange debts. To make good on those foreign debt obligations, many Thai companies 
have had to trim their profit margins to boost the competitiveness of their products in overseas 
markets. This puts pressure on exports from other Southeast Asian countries and erodes corporate 
earnings there. This, in turn, will put pressure on the currencies of those countries (Asian 
Business, ibid., p. 27). 
  3 The Changed Economic Environment in Asia 
  This is the time when we should acknowledge that the world has changed. For many 
Southeast Asian corporations, cost, risk and uncertainty have become the keywords of the 
currency drama. After the Thai Baht was cut down from its US dollar-led peg, investors turned on 
the Philippines, and then Malaysia, forcing central bankers to let currencies lide down from the 
carefully managed levels. Investors seem to have a belief that weakness in the economy will lead 
to a weakness in the currency (Geoge Soros' saying. Business Week, October. 3, 1994, p. 46). 
They thought that Malaysia and the Philippines had also a big problem with bank loans poured 
into overheating property markets, one of the key components behind Thailand's economic 
sufferings. 
   The week of August. 25, 1997, was the most brutal one in decades. Malaysia's government 
attempted to stabilize its injured stock market by limiting short selling by foreign investors. 
However, the wave of selling felt from Manila spread to Hong Kong. The Bank of Indonesia Aug. 
18 decision to raise treasury rates to 30% was to attract investors to hold rupiah, and to prevent 
the nation's currency from falling further. The Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Manila Bourses 
plunged nearly 40% over a couple of months. They are headed for a possible recession 
themselves. 
  In facts, things are coming to a crisis in the Southeast Asia. A decisive change in the 
psychology of Southeast Asia has occurred. Not long ago, the economies of this region seemed 
unstoppable. Today, slower growth and vulnerability to global market forces are common 
throughout his area. Global investors are astonished to see how the region's governments had
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been unprepared for this crisis. Now it is no longer easy to boost exports with foreign investment 
and cheap labor combined and to spend the money freely on government projects of questionable 
worth. The pressure from China has been increasingly growing. Its exports are expected to 
increase by 25 % in 1997, while Thai exports will rise less than 4%. Much of that is the result of 
China's growing global market share of garments, shoes, and toys but also reflects China's rise as 
a cheap manufacturing base for electronics, telecommunications equipment and machinery. 
   Proton Berhad, Malaysia's protected national carmaker, already plans to cut costs by 30% over 
the next three years. However, as it still heavily depends on imported parts that now are more 
expensive, it will have to become even more aggressive. Thailand's Siam Cement Co. wrote off 
$1 billion in foreign exchange losses. TelecomAsia Corp. has more than $850 million in 
foreign-denominated debt. All of it was unhedged, and should be repaid over the next 10 years 
(Business Week, September. 15, 1997, p. 20). 
   The slowdown in Southeast Asian growth will hit many multinationals as well. General 
Motors has poured $750 million into a new car plant in Thailand at a time when demand was 
beginning to fall. Hong Kong-based First Pacific, a conglomerate in telecoms and property across 
Asia, will have a $20 million decline in profits this year. 
  In the Philippines, three-month rates rose to 19% as a result of the Central Bank's attempt o 
defend the Peso. Its stock market plunged as liquidity dried up and investors feared that corporate 
earnings would take a huge fall. A recession is coming if the central bankers do not stop it. In 
fact interest-rate hikes are crude weapons for preventing currency declines. 
  Unlike in the era of galloping growth, today's Asian companies in a slow growth climate need 
fuller financial disclosures and more transparency to restore the foreign investors' confidence. In 
Malaysia, the fears that the balance sheets of top banks and conglomerates are false is one reason 
investors are bailing out. For example, the $162 million Renong Berhad, a diversified 
conglomerate, has raised more than $1 billion in loans offshore. However, that sum does not 
appear in its books (Business Week, ibid., p. 21). 
  Mahathir has denounced foreign investors. He blasted the IMF and called currency speculators 
"international criminals." But Mahathir's August. 28 decision to curtail short selling by foreign 
investors, whom he blamed for the steep fall in Malaysian share prices, increased speculation. 
Then, Mahathir directed state-managed pension funds to buy local equities. Against such 
intervention, Malaysian fund managers pushed the Kuala Lumpur index to a four-year low of 751 
(Business Week, ibid., p. 21) ." 
  While all attention is being given to Southeast Asia, the situation in South Korea and Japan 
has become worse. Korea's foreign debt towers 3.5 times above its foreign reserves. Five 
conglomerates slipped into bankruptcy in 1997. The eighth-largest chaebol, Kia Group, and other 
chaebols, including Ssangyoung, Hanwha, and Haitai, are under strain as their cash flows worsen. 
The Won has been tumbling, and could tumble even further in the future. Korean economy is still 
far from hitting bottom. 
  Banks lost $13 billion due to failing chaebol, equivalent to 60% of their combined capital. Ten 
of 25 Korean commercial banks showed losses in the first half of 1997. Korea First Bank made a
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stunning $395 million loss as a result of chaebol failures. 
   The Korean Won dropped to a record low of 910 to the U.S. dollar in late August 1997 before 
the central bank struggled to bring. it back to 900 on Sept. 3. To defend the Won, the Bank of 
Korea used $3 billion of its foreign reserves. The Won's decline, down 8% this year, caused a 
decrease in profits. Hyndai's car and electronics units lost $180 million in the first half of 1997 
(Business Week, September. 15, 1997, p. 21). 
   On the other hand, thanks to tax hikes and tighter government spending imposed by Japanese 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April, weak consumer spending and falling industrial 
production have the economy decelerating once more. With growth unlikely to exceed 1.7% this 
fiscal year, the benchmark Nikkei index has been falling since its June high. Now, with the 
turmoil. in the Southeast Asia, Japan faces new uncertainties over its economy. 
   Japanese manufacturers, for a decade, have been establishing production bases in the Southeast 
Asia to profit from the cheap labor and fast-growing consumer markets. Japanese xports to this 
region share about 44% of all her exports. Also, Japanese multinationals' Asia- based operations 
generated 40% of their offshore profits in 1996. Many Japanese companies have tried to make 
suppliers set up shops in this region and to create vast procurement ets of local partners there. 
   However, Japan's companies feel that this strategy is more and more ineffective. The slower 
growth in Southeast Asia means less demand for the Japanese products such as construction 
equipment and machine tools which share roughly 60% of Japan's exports to this region. 
Moreover, the currency devaluation also means that consumers in Thailand, Malaysia, and 
elsewhere find it difficult to buy the TVs, computers, and other goods that make up the rest of 
Japan's exports. Toyota Motor Corp. in Thailand began to reduce production by 20% in 1997. 
Honda Motor Co. and Nissan Motor Co. also made similar moves."' 
   Things are more dangerous in the banking sector. Japanese banks' lending exposure to the 
Southeast Asian companies is three times more than that of their U.S. counterparts. The region 
takes up some 70%, or $120 billion, of Japanese lenders' foreign-loan portfolio. Also, if regional 
borrowers start to default, it could add to the heavy problems of Japanese banks are facing, which 
are still burdened with $236 billion in bad loans for their own market. Such defaults in the 
Southeast Asia could surely delay a much-needed improvement in the Japanese lenders' balance 
sheets (Business Week, September 15, 1997, p. 22).9) 
   4 Increasing Fears of Huge Capital Migration from Southeast Asia to China 
   The Southeast Asia is now undergoing a sudden change in financial situations due to the new 
financial opportunities in China, which are attracting huge foreign companies. GE Capital Corp. 
got an equity stake in the $250 billion Zhabei power plant near Shanghai, which is the first 
Chinese power plant to be financed entirely by the private sector without any government 
guarantee. In addition, in May 1997, GE Capital also got permission to open a finance company 
which is the China's first wholly owned foreign one based in Shanghai. It will be able to lend 
money for everything to any foreign company. Other giant investment funds backed by American 
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International Group, Peregrine Investment Holdings and New World Development are pouring 
billions of dollars into road, port, and bridge projects in China (Business Week, September. 29, 
1997, p. 43). 
  Moreover, it is not a surprise that the World Bank is a big China booster. Now, China is the 
bank's biggest customer. The bank has recently decided to lend China $2.8 billion more, added to 
the total of $28 billion in China to build dams. China already attracted $42 billion foreign 
investment in 1996 and has $121 billion in currency reserves, not including Hong Kong's own $80 
billion. 
  The World Bank estimates China needs $600 billion to develop its projects. However, the 
bank does not think that huge amount can be met by public financing within China. The bank 
believes that China needs a reasonable financial system to facilitate foreign investment. Also, the 
World Bank is bringing in innovative financial techniques to deal with privately financed projects. 
For example, China signed a $700 million agreement in September 1997 with a consortium 
headed by the power utility Electricite de France. China will let the consortium build and operate 
a power station in Laibin. Only after 15 years, the Chinese government will be able to assume 
ownership. This technique is common in developing nations, but it is the first time for China to 
do this. 
  The International Finance Corp. (IFC), the arm of the World Bank that lends to private 
companies, is backing the emergence of a privately owned financial service industry in China and 
trying to expand lending to smaller companies. It is also trying to develop the first domestic bond 
rating agency in China (Business Week, September 29, 1997, p. 46). 
  Perhaps the World Bank's great favour to China's reforms derives from its philosophy of a 
market-oriented economy. It does not recognise the other possibility of a non-market policy. On 
September 11, 1997, the World Bank warned that because in Southeast Asia lenders and 
borrowers are often in relation of conglutination, financial systems are very fragile and need to be 
changed into much market-oriented ones. It also said that the market would loose confidence. in 
such uncleaned systems in this region, and as a result a large quantity of foreign capital would 
flow out of this region into the other regions which have a more functional market-oriented 
economy (Nippon Keizai Shinbun, 1997.9.12). 10) 
  Conclusion 
  I do not think Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir's denouncement of global investors is 
wrong. Thailand's Finance Minister Thanong at that time also said that it was the failure to 
liberalize financial system too fast and make Thai economy dependent on foreign short-term loans 
too quickly when he came to Tokyo to call for relief funds in July 1997. 
  Thailand set up an offshore monetary market as a symbol of liberalization of the financial 
system in 1993. Through that market, a huge amount of foreign capital flowed in, and that amount 
was far larger than the government expected. However, Thai economy is not big enough to absorb 
such a large amount of capital. So much of capital was spent on the property market and the 
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so-called bubble economy came into being. Foreign capital rushed in hurridly and fled away 
frightening fashion. They did not think about the positive role they could have played in Thailand. 
They wanted only instant reward. I do not believe that their flattering behaviour represents a
reasonable conomic movement. I dare to say they are no more capitalist han the "paparazzi". 
  The Prime Minister of Malaysia believes himself to be a victim of the capricious currency 
markets. In a speech during the opening weekend of the World BankJIMF meeting in Hong Kong, 
he painted a vivid conspiracy theory in which Western bankers and governments had done their 
best to knock off Malaysia. However, when they opened on Monday, the markets in Kuala 
Lumpur promptly continued their late-summer collapse. 
   Still, Mahathir's peech had some resonance in the region, given the brutal economic battering 
it has taken of late. The emotional urge to subdue the bloodless speculators and do something to 
restore the flagging East Asian economic miracle that once existed. That is hardly surprising - in 
part because Mahathir's conviction that the countries in Southeast Asia are victims is not entirely 
wrong. By effectively linking their currencies to the U .S. dollar, nations like Malaysia and 
Thailand became bit players in a much bigger game. They thought he dollar peg would give them 
some monetary stability. However, that is not the main reason for recent trouble in Southeast 
Asia. It comes from the changed strategies of the U.S. and Japan toward China."' 
  Trade and capital flows within Asia and across the Pacific are dominated by Japan and the 
United States. The dollar/yen exchange rate has become the subject of intense political interest but 
has rarely been stable. Twice since the mid-1980s, the exchange rate has shifted drastically. When 
Southeast Asian countries tied up with the dollar, it was a weak currency, and for a time it suited 
them in a beneficial way. Exports (many from transplanted Japanese factories in search of lower 
costs) boomed, overall growth rates surged and that virtuous combination attracted enormous 
amounts of portfolio investments from the West. 
  Regional governments forgot the central fact about markets: they often tumble excessively. 
 Moving in one direction or "the other, they tended to shift the value of a currency or commodity 
beyond the bounds that are set by underlying economic fundamentals. Also, speculators tried to 
appear as a friend, helping the other out. They hop onto what may be an economically rational 
move in the market and drove it to extremes. That was seen in the OPEC- driven oil "crisis" of 
the late 1970s. The price of a barrel of oil skyrocketed far beyond anything that was economically 
rational, driving up interest rates. Then, on the way down, the oil price simply collapsed, and by 
the late 1980s cities like Houston, Texas, came to look a lot like Bangkok, Thailand, and still 
does today, full of newly built offfice buildings that no one ever moves into. 
  What was once true of oil has also been true of the dollar. By 1995, the greenback had fallen 
to 78 against he yen. That was too low. So a correction was inevitable, and offficial nudges in 
Washington and Tokyo helped it along."' 
  Today the dollar has strengthened to 120 - a 50 percent swing in two years - and Southeast 
Asia, not surprisingly, got whiplashed. Exports slowed and current account deficits mounted. 
Under these circumstances, delinking from the dollar was inevitable. When two supertankers 
(U.S. and Japan) change their course, the little boats in between can take on water in a hurry if
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they do not get out of the way. However, too big swings in the part of Asian currencies hould be 
prevented as soon as possible. To realize such a condition I believe it is necessary to estabilish a 
kind of Asia Fund is necessary. 13) 
   notes 
1) However, many economists till thinks that East Asia is growing steadly. Jeffrey D. Sachs is 
one such writer. In 1950, following decades of war and turmoil, Asia's share of world GDP was 
a mere 17%. In the past three decades, Asia finally caught the tail winds of global capitalism. 
Rapid economic growth has propelled Asia's share to around 40%. Moreover, Asia's economies 
will be producing more than half of the world's income sometime in the early decades of the 21st 
century", he says (Sachs, Jeffrey D., "Asia's Miracle is Alive and Well", Time, September 29, 
1997, p. 40). 
2) The ballooning current-account deficits of Southeast Asian countries over the past few years 
helped instigate the region's present currency crisis. However, behind the situation lies China. 
"Our sales have fallen 80% from two years ago
," laments a Thai fabric wholesaler. Naturally, this 
has taken its toll on Thai textile producers. According to the Thai Textile Manufacturing 
Association, at least 100 Thai textile makers and garment makers have dropped out of the market 
last year. In recent years, China has improved the quality of. its merchandise through joint 
ventures with foreign companies. In January 1994, the country also devalued its convertible 
currency, the yuan, by 33% against the U.S. dollar. As a result, Chinese products began to 
supplant their Southeast Asian equivalents around the world. The trend was not confined to 
textiles and other traditional export sectors. Haier Group Co. of Shandong Province and 
Guangdong Kelong Electrical Holding Co. of Guangdong Province - two major Chinese makers of 
consumer electronics - turned to exports as a way to offset oversupply conditions at home. Market 
participants ay history has shown that there is often a lag of about two years between the time a 
currency loses value and the time when the loss starts to have a real impact on trade. China 
allowed its currency to depreciate in January 1994 in order to boost the strength of its exports. As 
a result, Chinese exports are growing, while export growth is slowing in Thailand and other 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that linked their currencies to 
the dollar (Goto,Takuhiko, " China weaves export success", The Nikkei Weekly, September 29, 
1997, p. 23). The volume of export from China to North America rose by 29% in the first half of 
the year in 1997 than the previous year, though that of Thailand rose only 4%. Sharp Co. Ltd. 
drastically shifts its outsoucing from the Southeast Asia to China because of its low costs 
(Nippon Keizai Shinbun, 1997.9.10) . 
3) The greatest cumulative amount of Japanese direct investments to Asia in 1995 was that to 
Indonesia, $18.6 billion. They invested $15 billion in Hong Kong, $13.2 billion in China, and 
$10.6 billion in Singapore. That of Thailand was the fifth in Asia, $8.4 billion, and $6.9 billion in
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Malaysia, $5.7 billion in Korea, $4.4 billion in Taiwan, $3.5 billion in Philippine. Japan is the 
greaest exporter to Thailand and the second biggest importer next to the U.S. Japanese direct 
investments to Thailand have increased since 1994 and 72.5% more in 1995 amounting to Bt243.1 
billion. Total Japanese banking loans to the East Asia exceed $120 billion and the share of Japan's 
export to this area is about 40%. However, the export volume of Japan to Thailand in July 1997 
decreased by 14.6% of that of the previous year. As for the mutual funds in the U.S., $5.6 billion 
flowed into Asian stock markets in 1993 when the boom prevailed in these emerging markets. But 
in 1997 $2.1 billion flowed out from these markets until the middle of August (Nippon Keizai 
Shinbun, 1997.9.8).
4) In the columns of advertisements in the Times, October 6, 1997, the message about Thailand's 
decision to accept an IMF-imposed recovery plan were announced by the Thailand Board of 
Investment, the Department of Export Promotion, The Bank of Thailand, and the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand. The messages tarted by saying, "Painful is the word to describe what 
happened to Thailand's economy this past year", and expressed Thai Government's resolve to 
accept the IMF plan. "On August 5, our Government finally decided not to go it alone, and 
accepted an IMF-imposed recovery plan in exchange for a loan package. In the days ahead, the 
Thai people will share the pain caused by the IMF 'medicine', but will emerge stronger for it" (p. 
7). The message confessed about the circumstances in July and August, 1997, and explained the 
details of the IMF plan. " By early August, it was apparent the Government had no choice but to 
seek emergency aid from the IMF. The IMF recommended strong medicine, packaged in a 
comprehensive standby credit and recovery plan. That plan was approved by the Thai Cabinet on 
August 5, and by the IMF itself on August 20". The plan includes a consortium of loans valued at 
$16.7 billion. However, this is no simple handout; the IMF has required Thailand to abide by 
stringent rules if recovery is to have a chance. The Government said, "the IMF plan is bitter 
medicine indeed for our once highflying economy. It includes a VAT increase from 7 to 10%, to 
raise revenue; a reduction of the current account deficit from 8% of GDP in 1996 to 5% in 1997 
and 3% in 1998. Meanwhile, inflation must be kept at 8-9%, and the economic growth rate 
maintained at a minimum of 23%. Moreover, the IMF requires that public spending be reduced 
except for essentials (e.g. public health, education, social welfare, infrastructure) and that the 
managed float of the Baht continue" (p. 9). The message ended with a call for foreign 
investments o Thailand often referred to as the Land of Smiles. The message xplained, "Literally 
translated, Thailand means 'Land of the Free' " ( p. 11). 
5) Paul Krugman pointed out that something like the 1994-95 Mexican peso crisis could happen 
in developing countries with current-account deficit of more than 5% of GDP. Also, he thinks that 
the epidemic of "bahtulism" sweeping across Asia is by no means the first such outbreak in 
modern times. "Even if we exclude the currency speculation that brought down the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971-73, or the attacks on the European Monetary System in 1992-93", he says, "the 
current financial uproar in Asia strongly resembles both the 'tequila' crisis that followed Mexico's
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1994 devaluation and the collapse of bank lending that precipitated the 1982 Latin debt crisis". He 
understands the two crises were caused by the uncritical enthusiasm by international investors 
(banks in the late 1970s, mainly mutual funds in the early 1990s). However, stories appear after 
that. Though Latin America's debt situation in 1982 was not really severe, there followed seven 
lean years of economic stagnation, during which the debtor countries remained effectively 
excluded from world capital markets. In the 1990s, by contrast, the crisis was terrible but 
short-lived: Over the past year, Mexico's economy has grown more than 8%. What made the 
difference was the creditors' confidence in debtors' government behavior. In the 1980s, creditors 
did not have such confidence, and the relationship between the debtors and their creditors was 
politicized. Moreover, when the second crisis struck, Latin leaders were wise enough not to look 
for someone to blame but to try to restore confidence. Krugman insists, "the return to normalcy 
may be delayed for a long time if leaders start looking for villains instead of solutions. Many 
Asian leaders doubtless understand this, but some, above all the Malaysian prime minister, 
apparently do not" (Krugman, P., "Latin Lessons for Asia", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 25, 1997, p. 34). 
6) To help growth in the next generation, Thailand needs to improve its schools, where Thailand 
lags behind other East Asian economies. The country can no longer rely on cheap labour alone. 
Rising wages are making Thai manufacturers uncompetitive in labour-intensive industries uch as 
shoes and textiles; Firms need to move up the ladder to higher-value products, such as consumer 
electronics and computer chips, as other East Asians have done. This is hampered by a'shortage in 
skills. In 1993 only 40% of 14-year-olds attended school, compared with 60% in Malaysia(The 
Economist, May 24, 1997, p. 11). 
7) But even businessmen i Kuala Lumpur, traditionally among Mahathir's greatest fans, fear his 
unorthodox approach might now bring political uncertainty and financial disaster. When, in 
August 1997, he responded to the slump in the stock-market by introducing a ban on certain types 
of trading, the market fell sharply, and the ban had to be lifted. Mahathir tends to see apocalyptic 
warnings of a Thai-style catastrophe as the prophecies of international conspirators bent on 
thwarting Malaysia's modernisation, and on subverting his authoritarian style of rule. He is not 
alone in Southeast Asia in blaming foreigners, but in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia such 
views are more tactfully expressed. Also, when, at the meetings of the last week of September, he 
made his, by now familiar, attack on currency speculators, notably America's George Soros, with 
a threat to ban dealing in the Malaysian currency, the ringgit, for purposes other than trade. When 
the foreign exchanges opened two days later, the ringgit predictably fell to a new low record, 
some 19% lower against he dollar than it had been in early July (The Economist, September 27, 
1997, p. 29). 
8) Efforts to establish the production basis in East Asia on the part of the Japanese companies 
were payed since the Plaza Agreement that the Yen should appreciate against he U.S. Dollar. At
-11-
that time, Japan's large trade surplus with the U.S., nearly $50 billion in 1984, was simply too 
large to ignore. Japan's global trade surplus, $61.6 billion in Japan fiscal year 1985, was only $12 
billion above the $50 billion surplus with the U.S. U.S. Ambassador to Japan at that time warned 
that it was a burden on the world trade system, and if it would continue to grow it would threaten 
a breakdown in that system (Masumi Muramatsu, Mansfield Speech, Simul Academy, 1987, p. 
10). Since then, high valued Yen drove many Japanese compnies to East Asia to produce their 
goods cheaply. 
9) Japanese banks lend more in Hong Kong than in any other Asian economy beyond Japan. 
According to the Nikkei Weekly, at the end of 1996 Japanese banks had $87.4 billion in 
outstanding loans to Hong Kong companies. Contrast hat with the $37.5 billion in loans extended 
by Japanese banks in Thailand. Japanese banks make 50-60% of their loans in Hong Kong to 
real-estate developers and local businesses, 20-30% to mainland Chinese companies and public 
agencies, and the remainder to Japanese companies in Hong Kong. So, the recent volatility in 
Hong Kong's economy, traditionally one of the most stable in Asia, has shaken investors and 
exposed Japan's vulnerable financial institutions (Masato Ishizawa, 'Investors running from risk', 
The Nikkei Weekly, Nov. 3. 1997, p. 19). 
10) Paul Krugman wrote in Time that the recent crises proves there's nothing superior about 
Asian values. He expressed his surprise at the mood of the executives from the multinational 
corporations then attending the regional conference held in Mexico in 1993. He said, "the 
executives were giddily upbeat; they saw nothing but boundless opportunities in a region enjoying 
unprecedented growth and transformation. They were in no mood to listen to concerns about 
productivity growth that did not seem to be as high as advertised, about trade deficits, about a 
worrisome tendency to borrow abroad and invest the money in speculative projects. In retrospect 
it seems almost incredible that neither governments nor investors took the 'tequila' crisis that 
engulfed Latin America 20 months later as a warning for Asia". And then he warned, " Asians 
had and have a right to be proud of what they have achieved. The doctrine of Asian 
exceptionalism, however, turns out to have been not merely silly, but dangerous. Partly this was 
because too many investors, domestic and foreign, took it as an excuse to believe that the good 
times could just keep on rolling - in particular, that the overheated Southeast Asian boom of the 
mid-90s, which drove real estate prices and trade deficits to what should have been seen as 
clearly unsustainable heights, could continue without limit" (Krugman, Paul, "Wrong, It Never 
Existed", Time, September 29, 1997, p. 41). 
11) Mahathir alleged that Mr Soros is motivated by the political agenda of his personal 
foundation, which supports efforts to build "open societies" in the former Soviet Union and 
elsewhere. The Soros Foundation has taken an interest in Myanmar, which is run by a repressive 
military regime, and Mr Soros disapproves of ASEAN'S controversial decision to admit Myanmar 
to membership on July 23, 1997. There is, Stanley Druckenmiller (the Soros Fund's chief
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investment officer) who insists thatthere is no connection between Soros Fund Management's 
initiatives to make money and the foundation's attempts to distribute it. Dr Mahathir, however, 
seems to resent both activities, which makes Mr Soros a politically expedient target. Some historic 
grudges may also be at work. Malaysia's Central Bank and the Soros funds clashed in 1993. In 
addition, the previous September, the Central Bank, Bank Negara, lost a fortune betting on 
sterling when the British currency fell out of the European exchange-rate mechanism and was 
devalued. This is a move that is said to have made Mr Soros a fortune (The Economist, August 2, 
1997, p. 62). 
12) The Economist accurately gave an explanation on the speculation. According to that paper, 
hedge funds, such as Mr Soros's Quantum Fund, have been blamed for much of the financial 
turmoil in recent years. Mahathir told the annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Hong 
Kong that currency trading (beyond, he conceded, the level needed to finance trade) was 
"unnecessary
, unproductive and immoral". The IMF estimates that hedge funds can mobilise 
between $600 billion and $1 trillion. Since Britain's problem in the 1960s, the volume of currency 
trading has burgeoned relative to trade. In 1995, $1.2 trillion of foreign exchange changed hands 
on a typical day. That is roughly 50 times the value of world trade in goods and services. In the 
early 1.970s, prior to the liberalisation of the world's capital markets, the value of currency trading 
was only six times greater than the value of "real" trade. Currency trading is likely to use to bet 
against currencies and other assets, for example, selling acurrency forward in the hope that they 
can buy it back later at a cheaper rate. That is said to play an important role in providing liquidity 
in the market for foreign-exchange, helping to match buyers and sellers. However, it does not 
mean currency markets are perfect. Financial markets are vulnerable to "bubbles" and excess 
volatility. In such cases, prices move more than is warranted by the underlying factors investors 
supposed to reflect. Differences in countries' inflation rates and current account deficits explain 
exchange-rate movements quite well in the long run, but in the shorter run currencies eem to 
disregard these fundamentals. For example, the dollar's fall from ¥260 in 1985 to ¥80 in 1995, 
and its subsequent rebound to around V120, cannot really be explained by the fundamentals. The 
problem is that all financial markets, from currencies to shares, are subject o waves of excessive 
optimism followed by excessive pessimism (The Economist, September 27, 1997, p. 93). 
13) Japanese Finance Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka expressed support for a plan to establish a 
regional emergency fund to prevent currency crises in Asia. In a Nikkei interview on Sept. 23 
Malaysian Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim said the Asia Fund, expected to total $50-60 billion, 
will likely be set up by the end of this year by members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Japan, China and South Korea, though China and South Korea have not yet 
made any official response to the request for them to join. Thai government spent some $20 
billion to defend its currency. Therefore, the $50-60 billion fund be sufficient o prevent currency 
crises in Asia. If the fund is $50-60 billion, Japanese officials say Japan is expected to contribute 
a little less than $20 billion. Many hurdles must be cleared before the fund can be realized. The
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first is the need to win international support. The U.S., the largest contributor to the IMF , is also 
playing a. role regarding the fund, although not a financial one. U.S.Treasury Secretary Robert 
Rubin said the U.S., Japan and ASEAN members will soon hold a new round of discussions on 
this issue. However, International Monetary Fund officials remain skeptical of the plan to form 
the so-called Asia Fund. The IMF has called the fund a mistake, saying it worries that a regional 
fund would undermine the functions of existing multilateral financial institutions. The IMF First 
Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer said, "We would be concerned about the establishment 
of an international body that would undercut conditions set by the IMF ." Germany has already 
dismissed the idea, warning that the fund could encourage governments o rely on a safety net in 
times of trouble (Ishizawa, Masato, "Asia Bailout Fund Gets Key Ally in Finance Minister", The 
Nikkei Weekly, September 29, 1997, pp. 1, 23). 
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DATA
Table 1. Trouble in Southeast Asia's Stock 
Markets (weekly close)
Mar. 7, '97 Aug. 29, '97
Bangkok bt 700 bt 500
Kuala Lumpur rt 3300 rt 2000
Manila ps 1250 ps 800
Jakarta rs 700 rs 500
(Bloomberg Financial Markets. cited in 
Business Week, Sept. 15, '97, p. 19)
Table 2. Korea's Won per U.S.Dollar 
 (weekly close)




Table 3. China's Economic Quandary 
   (billions of dollars) (Business Week, Sept. 29, '97, p. 42)
'87 '91 '96
Merchandise Exports 30 60 170
GDP 300 420 800
Foreign Direct Investment 2 4 43
Hard -Currency Reserves 20 48 135
Table 4. Balance of Payments of Several Countries 
(billions of dollars, A=deficit) (Data: Sakura Research Institute)






















































































Table 5, . Current Account Deficit Compared to GDP (%)
Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines
'94 A 5.6 A 6.3 A 1.6 A 4.6
'95 A 8.1 A 8.5 A 3.5 A 2.7
'96 A 8.2 A 6.0 A 3.4 A 4.2
(Data: Dept. of Economic Planning, Asian Economy 1997) 

















(Data: ibid. ) 
Table 7 China as NO_ I
Exports, Export Growth Net Foreign Average
2nd Quarter, from Investment, Hourly Wage,
1997 A Year Ago 1996 1997
(billion dollars) (%) (billion dollars) (dollars)
China 46.1 25 38.5 0.9 (Shanghai)
Hong Kong 47.8 (a) 4 6.2 (b) 7.3
Indonesia 13.1 7 5.3 1.8 (Jakarta)
Malaysia 19.7 A 0.2 3.3 4.6 (Kuala Lumpur)
Philippines 5.9 24 1.2 1.3 (Manila)
Singapore 32.1 4 2.0 5.2
Korea 35.8 9 A 1.6 6.2 (Seoul)
Taiwan 30.7 7 A 0.5 7.5 (Taipei)
Thailand 14.0 0.8 1.3 3.0 (Bangkok)
(a) includes large number of goods re-exported from China. 
(b) 1995 figure. includes investment for China, via Hong Kong. 
(Data: Time, Sept. 29, 1997, 39)
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